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PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY ALLOCATIONS AND OTHER ISSUES 
PURSUANT TO FINAL, TEMPORARY, AND PROPOSED REGULATIONS 
UNDER CODE SECS. 707 AND 752 
By 
Blake D. Rubin, Andrea M. Whiteway and Maximilian Pakaluk2 
Ernst & Young, LLP, Washington, D.C. 
2017 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. On October 5, 2016, Treasury published final, temporary, and proposed 
regulations under Code Sees. 707 and 752 (collectively, the "2016 Regulations"),3 
which consist of four basic parts: 
1. Final regulations under Code Sec. 707 maldng certain modifications to, 
and clarifications of, the disguised sale rules, mainly relating to the 
treatment of qualified liabilities and reimbursable capital expenditures. 
2. Temporary regulations under Code Sec. 752 disregarding "bottom dollar 
payment obligations." 
3. Proposed regulations under Code Sec. 752 broadening the application of 
anti-abuse rules in determining "economic risk ofloss" for partnership 
liabilities. 
4. A temporary regulation revising the allocation ofliabilities for purposes of 
the Code Sec. 707 disguised sale regulations. 
B. The major topic of this outline is the allocation of partnership liabilities. This 
issue is relevant to determining a partner's basis in its partnership interest. It is 
also relevant to determining the treatment of liabilities for purposes of the 
disguised sale rules. Both of these issues bear on whether a transaction can be 
done without causing a partner to recognize gain. 
C. The recently issued 2016 Regulations fundamentally change (or propose to 
change) the treatment of liabilities both for purposes of the disguised sale rules 
and generally under Code Sec. 752. 
2Copyright 2017 Blake D. Rubin, Andrea M. Whiteway and Maximilian Pakaluk. All rights reserved. 
3T.D. 9787 and 9788 and REG 122855-15, published in the Federal Register on October 5, 2016. 
D. Practitioners and taxpayers will need to adapt to this new regime, which no longer 
permits what previously constituted standard tax planning techniques for certain 
transactions and situations. 
E. Part II of this outline summarizes the temporary and proposed regulations under 
Code Sec. 752. 
F. Part III of this outline summarizes the temporary regulations under Code Sec. 707 
regarding the allocation of liabilities for purposes of the disguised sale rules. This 
outline does not address the modifications to, and clarifications of, the disguised 
sale rules, mainly relating to the treatment of qualified liabilities and reimbursable 
capital expenditures, made pursuant to the fmal regulations under Code Sec. 707. 
II. TEMPORARY AND PROPOSED REGULATIONS UNDER CODE SEC. 752 
A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1. For over two decades, taxpayers have relied on a set of rules governing the 
allocation of partnership liabilities among partners. These rules provided 
clarity and were both administrable and flexible. 
2. The newly issued Code Sec. 752 regulations, in many cases, make it 
impossible for taxpayers to allocate liabilities with any degree of certainty. 
In addition, especially with respect to the proposed regulations, they 
would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for taxpayers to 
transfer. property subject to debt in excess of basis to a partnership without 
triggering gain at the time of the transfer or subsequently. 
3. The Code Sec. 752 regulations that were issued in the 1990s (as amended, 
but for the 2016 Regulations, the "Existing Regulations") embraced the 
view expressed by the American Law Institute in its landmark, two-
volume 1984 study of subchapter K issues and proposals. In that study, the 
American Law Institute stated: 
Once it is decided to apply relatively strict rules to profit-and-loss 
allocations ... there seem to be no important policies serveq by a 
strict rule for allocating liabilities among partners in computing 
their basis for their partnership interests. This is particularly true 
when there appears to be more than one justifiable allocation with 
no single one being clearly conect.4 
The Code Sec. 704(b) regulations provide strict rules for allocating profits 
and losses. 
4American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project: Subchapter K, Proposals on Taxation of Partners, at 264 
(1984). 
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4. It is widely understood that the original motivation for changing the Code 
Sec. 752 regulations was to limit taxpayers' ability to structure a leveraged 
partnership transaction. Those transactions attempted to comply with the 
debt-financed distribution exception to the partnership disguised sale rules 
under Code Sec. 707.5 As discussed in part III, the recently issued final 
regulations under Code Sec. 707 address this concern effectively. 
5. Temporary Code Sec. 752 Regulations: 
a. The temporary Code Sec. 752 regulations provide that a "bottom 
dollar payment obligation" ("BDPO") that historically created a 
recourse liability to the obligor will no longer increase the 
obligated partner's share of partnership liabilities. The Treasury's 
justification is that such obligations generally lack a significant 
non-tax commercial business purpose.6 
b. The temporary regulations provide for a seven-year transition 
period during which some BDPOs may still be taken into account 
under the existing partnership recourse debt allocation rules. 
c. BDPOs are admittedly not "commercial," but they addressed a 
policy flaw in the prior regulations that often required taxpayers to 
enter into BDPOs in order to achieve inoffensive allocations of 
liabilities that should have been permitted under those regulations. 
6. Proposed Code Sec. 752 Regulations: 
a. The proposed Code Sec. 752 Regulations set forth a nonexclusive 
list of factors that will be considered in determining whether there 
exists a plan to circumvent or avoid a payment obligation. The 
proposed regulations will apply prospectively from the date they 
are published in final form. 
b. The proposed regulations would impose subjective-and in many 
cases noncommercial-requirements that practitioners must 
consider in order to conclude that any partnership liability is 
properly treated as a recourse liability under Code Sec. 752. 
5 Amy S. Elliott, Treaswy Officials Explain New Bottom-Dollar Guarantee Rules, 2014 TNT 38-4 (Mar. 3, 2014) 
(quoting Lisa Zarlenga, Treasury tax legislative counsel, as saying "When we were considering changes in the Code 
Sec. 752 rules related to [the debt-financed distribution] exception, we determined that certain principles that were 
being applied for just Code Sec. 707 purposes ought to apply equally in non-disguised sale cases"). 
6See the Preamble ofthe Temporary Regulations. 
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c. They proposed regulations would create an un-administrable 
regime and would shift allocations of debt away from partners who 
bear real economic risk for the debt to those who do not bear any 
economic exposure. 
7. Executive Order 13789 and Subsequent Developments: 
a. In Executive Order 13789,7 the Secretary of the Treasury was 
directed to immediately review all significant tax regulations 
issued on or after January 1, 2016, and submit a report identifying 
regulations that (i) impose an undue fmancial burden on U.S. 
taxpayers; (ii) add undue complexity to the Federal tax laws; or 
(iii) exceed the statutory authority of the IRS. 
b. The IRS and Treasury issued Notice 2017-38,8 identifying 
regulations as either imposing an undue fmancial burden on 
taxpayers or adding undue complexity to the Code, and the Notice 
included the temporary Section 752 regulations on BDPOs. 
c. On October 2, 2017, the Treasury issued the "Second Report to the 
President on Identifying and Reducing Tax Regulatory Burdens." 
This report indicates that the Treasury believes the BDPO 
regulations should be retained and that the Treasury does not plan 
to propose substantial changes to the regulations. 
B. ALLOCATION OF PARTNERSHIP LIABILITIES: GENERAL RULES 
1. Background 
a. Since at least 1956, the theory underlying the regulations 
goveming the allocation of partnership liabilities has been that 
liabilities should be allocated to partners who would be required to 
pay the liability if the partnership were unable to do so because 
those partners are considered to bear the economic burden for the 
liability. 
b. If a lender would have no recourse to any partner if the pattnership 
were unable to repay the liability, only partnership profits could 
satisfy the liability. Accordingly, the regulations have allocated 
7 82 Fed. Reg. 19317 (Apr. 21, 2017). 
8 2017-30 I.R.B. 147. 
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partnership nonrecourse liabilities among the partners in the same 
way the partnership's profits would be allocated among them. 9 
2. Recourse Liabilities 
a. A partnership liability is a recourse liability to the extent that any 
partner or related person bears the "economic risk of loss" for that 
liability. 10 In general, recourse liabilities are allocated to the 
partner who would be responsible for paying them if the 
partnership were unable to. 
b. To determine who bears the economic risk of loss for a recourse 
liability, the regulations employ a "constructive liquidation" test. 
Reg. § 1. 752-2(b )(1) provides that upon a constructive liquidation, 
all of the following events are deemed to occur simultaneously: 
1. All of the partnership's liabilities become payable in full. 
11. With the exception of property contributed to secure a 
partnership liability, all of the partnership's assets, 
including cash, have a value of zero. 
111. The partnership disposes of all of its property in a fully 
taxable transaction for no consideration (except relief from 
liabilities for which the creditor's right to repayment is 
limited solely to one or more assets of the partnership). 
IV. All items of income, gain, loss or deduction are allocated 
among the partners. 
v. The partnership liquidates. 
c. A partner bears the economic risk of loss for a liability to the 
extent that, if the partnership constructively liquidated, the partner 
(or a related person) would be obligated to either pay a creditor or 
make a contribution to the partnership because the liability would 
. be due and the partner (or related person) would not be entitled to 
reimbursement. 11 
9See American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project: Subchapter K, Proposals on Taxation of Partners, at 264 
(1984). 
10Reg. §1.752-l(a) (1). 
11Reg. § 1.752-2(b ). In addition, a partner bears the economic risk ofloss for a liability to the extent the partner (or a 
related person) makes (or acquires an interest in) a nonrecourse loan to the partnership and the economic risk ofloss 
for the liability is not borne by another partner. Reg. § 1.752-2(c). 
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d. In circumstances where a pminer is entitled to reimbursement, the 
economic risk of loss is shifted to the obligor under such 
reimbursement ~nangement. Reg. §1.752-2(b)(3) provides that all 
statutory and contractual obligations relating to the partnership 
liability are taken into account for purposes of determining which 
pminer bears the risk of loss, including contractuai obligations 
outside the partnership agreement such as 
1. guarantees, indemnifications, reimbursement agreements 
and other obligations running directly to creditors or to 
other pminers, or to the partnership; 
11. obligations to the pminership that are imposed by the 
partnership agreement, including the obligation to make a 
capital contribution and to restore a deficit capital account 
upon liquidation of the partnership; and 
111. payment obligations (whether in the form of direct 
remittances to another partner or a contribution to the 
patinership) in1posed by state law, including the governing 
state partnership statute. 
e. Accordingly, an obligation to make a contribution to a partnership 
pursuant to a capital account deficit restoration obligation ("DRO") 
is generally taken into account as an obligation of a patiner under 
the regulations, subject to the new rule for BDPOs. 
f. For purposes of detennining the extent to which a partner or 
related person has a payment obligation and bears the economic 
risk of loss for a recourse liability, it is assumed that all partners 
and related persons actually perform on their obligations, 
inespective of their net worth, unless the facts and circumstances 
indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the obligation. 12 
g. A patiner's or related person's obligation to make a payment may 
be disregarded or treated as an obligation of another person. This 
can occur if the facts and circumstances indicate that a principal 
purpose of the anangement between the parties is to (1) eliminate 
the pminer's economic risk of loss with respect to the obligation or 
(2) create the appearance that the partner or related person bears 
the economic risk of loss when, in fact, the substance of the 
anangement is othe1wise. 13 
12Reg. §1.752-2(b)(6); Reg. §1.752-2(j) (3). 
l3Reg. §1.752-2(j)(l). 
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3. Nonrecourse Liabilities 
14Reg. §1.752-3(a)(l). 
15Reg. § 1.752-3(a) (2). 
a. A partnership liability is a nonrecourse liability if no partner or 
related person bears the economic risk of loss for that liability. 
b. Under Reg. §1.752-3(a), a partner's share of partnership 
nonrecourse liabilities equals the sum of three tiers of allocations. 
1. First, a partner is allocated an amount of a partnership's 
nonrecourse liabilities equal to the amount of that partner's 
share of partnership minimum gain determined under Code 
Sec. 704(b ). 14 
a) The partnership minimum gain is generally the 
excess of the amount of a nonrecourse liability over 
the Code Sec. 704(b) book value of the property 
securing the liability. 
ii. Second, a partner is allocated an amount of a partnership's 
nonrecourse liabilities equal to the amount of any taxable 
gain that would be allocated to the partner under Code Sec. 
704(c) (or in the same manner as under Code Sec. 704(c) if 
partnership property is revalued), if the partnership 
disposed of all partnership property subject to nonrecourse 
liabilities for no consideration other than full satisfaction of 
the liabilities. 15 
a) The second tier amount is often referred to as "Code 
Sec. 704(c) minimum gain." 
111. Third, a partner's share of the amount of nonrecourse 
liabilities that is not allocated to partners under the first or 
second tiers ("excess nonrecourse liabilities") is detetmined 
in accordance with the partner's share of partnership 
profits. 
a) The partner's interest in partnership profits is 
determined by taking into account all facts and 
circumstances regarding the partners' economic 
arrangement. 
b) The partnership agreement may specify the 
partner's interest in partnership profits for purposes 
7 
of allocating excess nonrecourse liabilities provided 
the interest so specified is reasonably consistent 
with allocations (that have substantial economic 
effect under the Code Sec. 704(b) regulations) of 
some significant item of partnership income or gain. 
c) Alternatively, excess nonrecourse liabilities may be 
allocated among the pminers in accordance with the 
manner in which it is reasonably expected that the 
deductions attributable to those nonrecourse 
liabilities will be allocated. 
d) Additionally, the partnership may first allocate 
excess nonrecourse liabilities to a partner up to the 
amount of built-in gain that is allocable to the 
partner on Code Sec. 704(c) property or property 
for which reverse Code Sec. 704( c) allocations are 
applicable by virtue of a book-up (as described in 
Reg. §1.704-3(a)(6)(i)) where such property is 
subject to the nonrecourse liability to the extent that 
such built-in gain exceeds the amount of gain taken 
into account under the Reg. §1.752-3(a)(2) with 
respect to such prope1iy (this last allocation method, 
the "Additional Method"). 16 
1v. The Additional Method was added to Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3) 
by regulations issued on October 31, 2000. The preamble to 
the regulations proposing the Additional Method explained 
the change as follows: 
Under section 73l(a), a pminer will recognize gain 
on the distribution of money by the partnership to 
the extent that the distribution exceeds the pminer's 
adjusted basis in its partnership interest. Section 
704(c) generally ensures that any built-in gain on 
contributed prope1iy will be recognized by the 
contributing pminer upon the disposition of the 
property by the partnership. The partnership 
liability allocation rules arguably should not 
accelerate the contributing partner's recognition of 
16In the Final Regulations under Code Sec. 707 adopted as part of the regulations discussed herein, the following 
language was added to the end of Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3) addressing disguised sale transactions: "The significant item 
method, alternative method, and additional method do not apply for purposes of §1.707-5(a)(2). To the extent that a 
partnership uses this additional method and the entire amount of the excess nomecourse liability is not allocated to 
the contributing pmtner, the partnership must allocate the remaining amount of the excess nomecourse liability 
under one of the other methods in this paragraph (a )(3)." 
8 
that gain when the amount of the partnership's 
liability attributable to such property is sufficient, if 
allocated to the contributing partner, to prevent 
such partner from recognizing gain. 
In response to comments received, the proposed 
regulations modify the third tier to allow a 
partnership to allocate the portion of a nonrecourse 
liabilities in excess of the portions allocated in tiers 
one and two (excess nonrecourse liabilities) based 
on the excess section 704( c) gain attributable to the 
property securing the liability. Thus, to the extent a 
portion of a partnership nonrecourse liability is · 
available to be allocated in the third tier, the 
partnership may allocate that portion to the 
contributing partner based on the excess section 
704( c) gain inherent in the property. 17 [Emphasis 
added.] 
v. Notwithstanding the intended effect of that amendment to 
the regulations, the regulations still had certain 
shortcomings in achieving this identified goal, and 
taxpayers have used BDPOs to remedy these shortcomings 
in ways that appear consistent with the intent of the 
Existing Regulations. 
C. TEMPORARY CODE SEC. 752 REGULATIONS 
1. BPDOs 
a. The temporary regulations provide that in determining whether a 
partner bears the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability, 
any BDPO will not be recognized. Specifically, Temporary Reg. 
§ 1. 752-2T(b )(3)(ii)(C)(l) sets forth the following definition of a 
BDPO: 
1. With respect to a guarantee or similar arrangement, any 
payment obligation other than one in which the partner or 
related person is or would be liable up to the full amount of 
such partner's or related person's payment obligation if, 
and to the extent that, any amount of the. partnership 
liability is not otherwise satisfied. 
17The preamble to the notice of proposed rulemaking, 65 FR 2084 (Jan. 13, 2000). 
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11. With respect to an indemnity or similar arrangement, any 
payment obligation other than one in which the partner or 
related person is or would be liable up to the full amount of 
such partner's or related person's payment obligation, if, 
and to the extent that, any amount of the indemnitee's or 
benefited party's payment obligation that is recognized 
under this paragraph (b )(3) is satisfied. 
111. An anangement with respect to a partnership liability that 
uses tiered pa1tnerships, intermediaries, senior and 
subordinate liabilities, or similar anangements to convert 
what would otherwise be a single liability into multiple 
liabilities if, based on the facts and circumstances, the 
liabilities were incuned pursuant to a comn1on .plan, as pmt 
of a single transaction or anangement, or as pmt of a series 
of related transactions or arrangements, and with a 
principal purpose of avoiding having at least one of such 
liabilities or payment obligations with respect to such 
liabilities being treated as a bottom dollar payment 
obligation as described in paragraph (b )(3)(ii)(C)(1 )(i) or 
(ii) ofthis section. 
b. A bottom guarantee can be illustrated as follows: 
1. Example 1. Assume that X is a limited pmtner in a limited 
pmtnership and is allocated one percent of pmtnership 
profits and losses. The palinership's only debt is a 
nonrecourse debt of $100 from a third paliy. X wishes to 
receive an enhanced allocation of liabilities. X enters into a 
bottom guarantee of $10 of the debt that is legally 
enforceable under state law. The bottom guarantee is, in 
effect, a guarantee of the last dollars of the debt, which is 
the least risky portion of the debt. The bottom is a 
guarantee of collection rather than ofpayment18 and 
provides that X shall not be obligated to make any payment 
under the guarantee until the lender has exhausted its 
remedies against the bonower and the collateral and has 
failed to collect at least $10. Thus, in general, X will only 
have economic exposure under the bottom guaranty to the 
extent the value of the collateral declines below $10. 
18 A guarantee of collection requires that the lender pursue its remedies against the collateral (e.g., through 
foreclosure) before pursuing the guarantor for any deficiency. A guaranty of payment does not require the lender to 
pursue its remedies against the collateral before pursuing the guarantor. 
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c. The temporary regulations provide that in determining whether a 
partner or related person has an obligation that will be recognized 
as such for purposes of Reg. §1.752-2, the facts and circumstances 
at the time of the determination will be considered and all statutory 
and contractual obligations relating to the partnership liability will 
be taken into account, including 
1. contractual obligations outside the partnership agreement 
such as guarantees, indemnifications, reimbursement 
agreements, 
11. payment obligations imposed by state or local law and 
other obligations running directly to creditors, to other 
partners, or to the partnership; and 
111. obligations to the partnership that are imposed by the 
partnership agreement, including the obligation to make a 
capital contribution and to restore a deficit capital account 
upon liquidation of the partnership as described in Reg. 
§ 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3) (taking into account Reg. §1.704-
l(b)(2)(ii)(c)).19 
d. The temporary regulations recognize that arrangements tantamount 
to a BDPO can arise through the use of tiered partnerships, 
intermediaries, senior and subordinate liabilities or similar 
arrangements. Thus, the temporary regulations provide that these 
types of arrangements can create a BDPO if, based on the facts and 
circumstances, the liabilities were incurred pursuant to a common 
plan, as part of a single transaction or arrangement, or as part of a 
series of related transactions or arrangements, and with a principal 
purpose of avoiding having at least one of such liabilities or 
payment obligations with respect to such liabilities being treated as 
aBDPO. 
1. For example, if a partner's guarantee ofthe last $50 of a 
$100 partnership liability is a BDPO, it should not be 
possible to circumvent this result by splitting the liability 
into a senior $50 liability and a junior $50 liability and 
having the partner guarantee all of the former and none of 
the latter. 
e. The temporary regulations include a few exceptions. 
19Temporaty Reg. § 1.752-2T (b )(3)(i). 
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1. Temporary Reg. §1.752-2T(3)(B)(ii)(c)(2) provides: 
A payment obligation is not a bottom dollar 
payment obligation merely because a maximum 
amount is placed on the partner's or related person's 
payment obligation, a partner's or related person's 
payment obligation is stated as a fixed percentage of 
every dollar of the partnership liability to which 
such obligation relates, or there is a right of 
proportionate contribution numing between partners 
or related persons who are co-obligors with respect 
to a payment obligation for which each of them is 
jointly and severally liable. 
11. Thus, it is pennissible to place a cap on a partner's payment 
obligation without turning it into a BDPO. 
111. Also, a payment obligation for a fixed percentage of every 
dollar, instead of the entire amount, of a partnership 
liability (a "vertical slice") is not thereby tumed into a 
BDPO. 
IV. Moreover, having a right to proportionate contribution 
among co-obligor partners with respect to a payment 
obligation, where the partners are jointly and severally 
liable, does not make the payment obligation a BDPO. 
f. Temporary Reg. § 1. 752-2T(b )(3)(ii)(B) provides that if a partner 
or related person has a payment obligation that would be 
recognized but for the effect of an indenmity, reimbursement 
agreement or similar arrangement, such payment obligation is 
recognized if, taking into account the indemnity, reimbursement 
agreement, or sinlilar anangement, the partner or related person is 
liable for at least 90 percent of the partner's or related person's 
initial payment obligation ("90% Obligation"). 
1. Thus, if a partner's payment obligation would be 
characterized as a BDPO because of the effect of an 
indenmity, reimbursement agreement or similar 
arrangement, but after taking such arrangement into 
account, the partner is still liable for at least 90 percent of 
the pmtner's initial payment obligation, then the obligation 
is not a BDPO. 
g. Temporary Reg. §1.752-2T(b)(3)(iii) provides that "[a]n 
indenmity, reimbursement agreement, or similar anangement will 
be recognized only if, before taking into account the indemnity, 
12 
reimbursement agreement, or similar arr-angement, the 
indemnitee's or other benefited party's payment obligation is 
recognized under this paragraph (b )(3), or would be recognized 
under this paragraph (b )(3) if such person were a partner or related 
person." 
1. In other words, an indemnity is not recognized if it is an 
indemnity of a payment obligation that is already a BDPO. 
2. Anti-Abuse Rule 
a. The Existing Regulations contain an anti-abuse rule that deals with 
situations where 
1. a partner enters into a contractual obligation that permits a 
partnership to obtain or retain a loan, 
ii. which significantly reduces the risk to the lender, and 
111. a principal purpose of the obligation is to permit other 
partners to include a portion of the loan in their outside 
basis.20 
b. In those cases, the partner would be treated as bearing the 
economic risk of loss. 
c. The temporary regulations amend this provision to provide that 
only the IRS is permitted to apply this anti-abuse rule. 
d. In addition, the temporary regulations allow the IRS to disregard 
contractual obligations where one partner enters into a payment 
obligation and another partner enters into a payment obligation 
with a principal purpose to cause the former partner's contractual 
obligation to be disregarded as a BDPO. 
3. Disclosure Rules 
20Reg. §1.752-2G)(2). 
a. The temporary regulations impose a disclosure obligation on 
partnerships that have a liability that is subject to a BDPO. 
1. The partnership must attach a completed Form 8275, 
Disclosure Statement, with the partnership return for the 
tax year in which the BDPO is undertaken or modified. 
Such disclosure must identify the payment obligation, 
13 
include the amount of the payment obligation and the 
parties to the payment obligation. 
b. Interestingly, this disclosure requirement applies even though the 
BDPO is disregarded for purposes of the Code Sec. 752liability 
allocation rules. 
c. Additionally, to the extent that the pminership is taking the 
position that the BDPO creates a recourse liability debt allocation 
pursuant to the 90% Obligation, the partnership must also disclose 
to the IRS on Form 8275 the facts and circumstances that clearly 
establish that a partner or related person is liable for up to 90 
percent of the partner's or related person's initial payment 
obligation.21 
4. Effective Date and Transition Relief 
a. The temporary regulations are generally applicable to liabilities 
incuned or assumed by a partnership and payment obligations 
imposed or undertaken with respect to a partnership liability on or 
after October 5, 2016, other than liabilities incuned or assumed by 
a partnership and payment obligations imposed or undertaken 
pursuant to a written binding contract in effect prior to that date. 
b. To ease the potential effect of these new rules, the temporary 
regulations provide for a seven-year transition period. During that 
period, if a partner (the "transition patiner") has a share of recourse 
liabilities under Reg. §1.752-2(b) ofthe Existing Regulations, the 
partnership may choose not to apply the new BDPO rules to an 
amount of partnership liabilities equal to the excess of (A) the 
transition partner's share of recourse liabilities over (B) its 
adjusted basis in the partnership interest. 
c. The mnount of partnership liabilities to which the transition rule 
· applies is reduced to the extent that the built-in gain attributable to 
the transition partner's negative tax basis capital account is 
recognized. 
1. Further, if the transition partner is a partnership, S 
corporation or disregarded entity, a 50 percent or greater 
change in ownership of the transition pminer will terminate 
the transition period. 
21Temporary Reg. §1.752-2T(b)(3)(ii)(D). 
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d. Because the seven-year transition rule applies only if elected by the 
partnership, partners that have entered into BDPOs for partnership 
liabilities should take steps to assure that the partnership makes 
that election. 
D. TECHNICAL ISSUES RAISED BY TEMPORARY REGULATIONS 
1. DROs and Capital Contribution Obligations 
a. The preamble to the temporary regulations states that "any 
payment obligation under §1.752-2, including an obligation to 
make a capital contribution and to restore a deficit capital account 
upon liquidation ofthe partnership as described in §1.704-
1(b )(2)(ii)(b )(3), may be a bottom dollar payment obligation if it 
meets the requirements set forth above."22 
b. Nevertheless, the actual definition of a BDPO provides no 
guidance as to how to determine whether a DRO or capital 
contribution obligation is a BDPO. The definition ofBDPO that 
presumably is viewed by Treasury as applicable to DROs and 
capital contribution obligations is as follows: 
With respect to a guarantee or similar arrangement, any 
payment obligation other than one in which the partner or 
related person is or would be liable up to the full amount of 
such partner's or related person's payment obligation if, 
and to the extent that, any amount of the partnership 
liability is not otherwise satisfied. 23 
c. Thus, the definition of a BDPO requires a guarantee or similar 
arrangement that relates to a particular partnership liability, and a 
conclusion that the obligor would not be liable for the full amount 
of the obligor's payment obligation "if, and to the extent that, any 
amount of the partnership liability is not othe1wise satisfied." 
[Emphasis added.] 
d. In contrast, a DRO is primarily an invention of the Code Sec. 
704(b) regulations, which provide a safe harbor for respecting a 
partnership's allocations of profit and losses if the partnership 
agreement imposes a DRO and certain other requirements are met. 
The relevant Code Sec. 704(b) regulations state: 
22T.D. 8788, Preamble at 15. 
23Temporary Reg. § 1. 752-2T(b )(3)(ii)(C)(l )(i). 
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If such partner has a deficit balance in his capital account 
following the liquidation of his interest in the patinership, 
as determined after taking into account all capital account 
adjustments for the partnership taxable year during which 
such liquidation occurs (other than those made pursuant to 
this requirement (3)), he is unconditionally obligated to 
restore the amount of such deficit balance to the partnership 
by the end of such taxable year (or, if later, within 90 days 
after the date of such liquidation), which amount shall, 
upon liquidation of the partnership, be paid to creditors of 
the patinership or distributed to other patiners in 
accordance with their positive capital account balances (in 
accordance with requirement (2) of this paragraph 
(b )(2)(ii)(b )).24 
e. Thus, a DRO does not relate to a particular partnership liability, 
and in fact the proceeds of the DRO payment may be paid "to 
creditors of the partnership or distributed to other partners." 
f. In our experience, a "bottom" DRO is effectuated by creating a 
tiered allocation of losses under the partnership agreement so that 
patiners other than the partner entering into the DRO are allocated 
the first losses on disposition of patinership property, and the 
partner entering into the DRO is allocated the last losses. 25 
1. This creates a situation where the DRO is required to be 
paid only if the partnership's propetiy loses virtually all of 
its value. The definition ofBDPO in the temporary 
regulations simply has no relevance to or bearing on the 
determination of whether a particular DRO is a BDPO. Nor 
does it aid in determining whether a capital contribution 
obligation (which presumably would apply regardless of 
whether the patiner has a deficit capital account) is a 
BDPO. 
2. Ninety-percent Obligations 
a. As noted above, the 90% Obligation provisions provide relief for a 
patiner whose payment obligation would be characterized as a 
BDPO because of the effect of an indemnity, reimbursement 
agreement or similar arrangement, provided that after taking such 
24Reg. §1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3). 
25See Blake D. Rubin, Andrea M. Whiteway & Jon G. Finkelstein, Put a 'Bottom' Deficit Restoration Obligation in 
Your Partnership Liability Allocation Toolldt, J. P ASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, Nov.-Dec. 2014, at 29. 
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arrangement into account, the partner is still liable for at least 90 
percent of the partner's initial payment obligation. 
1. While this provision provides some flexibility to taxpayers 
who enter into these arrangements, there is some question 
about the extent of relief provided. 
b. Example 2. If partner A has a payment obligation with respect to 
the entirety of a $100 partnership liability, the payment obligation 
is not turned into a BDPO simply because partner B indemnifies 
partner A for the top $5 of partner A's payment obligation. It 
would be turned into a BDPO, however, if partner B indemnifies 
partner A for the top $11 of partner A's payment obligation. 
1. Suppose instead that partner B guarantees the first $10 of a 
borrowing, and partner A guarantees the next $90 of a 
borrowing, which would result in a similar conclusion as to 
partner A. Economically, partner A continues to be 
obligated for the same $90 of the partnership liability. 
However, a literal reading of Temporary Reg. §1.752-2T 
seems to require that there exist an arrangement running in 
favor of partner A in order to permit partner A to rely on 
the exception. 
n. The preamble to the temporary regulations reinforces this 
interpretation by explaining that the exception is intended 
to petmit "payment obligation that would be recognized 
(initial payment obligation) under Temp. Reg. § 1. 752-
2T(b )(3) but for the effect of an indemnity, reimbursement 
agreement, or similar arrangement ... if, taking into 
account the indemnity, reimbursement agreement, or 
similar arrangement, the partner or related person is liable 
for at least 90 percent of the initial payment obligation." 
3. Effective Date and Transition Issues 
a. While the effective date and transition relief provide some ability 
for taxpayers to continue to rely on prior law and their pre-existing 
methodology for allocation of partnership liabilities, the effective 
date and transition rules leave open many questions. 
b. In general, it appears that the temporary regulations would apply to 
any liability incurred after the effective date, even if that liability 
refinances a pre-effective-date liability that was subject to a 
BDPO. 
1. It is unclear how the prospective effective date would apply 
to a BDPO for a term of years entered into before the 
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effective date that contains an elective or automatic 
extension, subject to the right to terminate the obligation 
with sufficient notice and satisfaction of specified te1ms. 
n. Arguably, if those provisions are in a written binding 
contract, an extended BDPO should continue to be subject 
to the Existing Regulations. However, if a BDPO is 
amended on or after October 5, 2016, the BDPO would 
likely be treated as a new obligation subject to the 
temporary regulations. The application of the effective date 
rules is explored in ~he following examples. 
a) Example 3. Before the effective date of the 
Temporary Regulations, a partnership enters into a 
nonrecourse loan from Ban1c X with a 10-year term. 
To maintain A's allocable share of the liability to 
avoid gain recognition as a result of a deemed 
distribution under Code Sec. 752(b) in excess of 
A's basis in the partnership interest, A enters into a 
bottom guarantee of the liability. A's guarantee 
provides that it has an initial term of three years and 
is thereafter automatically extended for successive 
one-year terms un1ess A provides six-months prior 
written notice to Bank X, and the partnership 
satisfies specified fmancial requirements. Assume 
the Temporary Regulations became effective on the 
second anniversary of the partnership incurring the 
· Ban1c X debt. 
[i] Presumably, A's guarantee would be 
grandfathered for the balance of the initial 
term because the liability was incurred, and 
A's payment obligation was imposed or 
undertaken, pursuant to a written binding 
contract entered into before the date the 
Temporary Regulations became effective. 
[ii] Would each automatic one-year extension of. 
A's guarantee also be grandfathered? 
Arguably, it should be, because it was 
imposed or undertaken pursuant to a written 
binding contract entered into before the 
effective date of the temporary regulations. 
b) Example 4. The facts are the same as in Example 3, 
except that the partnership and A also enter into a 
debt maintenance agreement that obligates the 
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partnership to maintain a specified level of debt that 
must be guaranteed by A for a 10-year period. A's 
guarantee of the Bank X liability is for the full 10-
year term. Assume the temporary regulations 
became effective on the second anniversary of the 
partnership incurring the Banlc X liability. On the 
third anniversary, the partnership refinances the 
Banlc X liability with a loan from Banlc Y. Under 
the debt maintenance agreement, A is required to 
enter into a similar bottom guarantee of the Bank Y 
liability. 
[i] Is A's guarantee of the Bank Y liability 
grandfathered and subject to the Existing 
Regulations because both the Bank Y 
liability and the guarantee were undertaken 
pursuant to the debt maintenance agreement, 
which is a written binding contract entered 
into before the effective date of the 
temporary regulations? 
c) Example 5. The facts are the same as in Example 3, 
except that A has the right, but not the obligation, to 
enter into a bottom guarantee of the partnership's 
debt for a 10-year period under the debt 
maintenance agreement. 
[i] If A enters into a bottom guarantee of the 
Bank Y liability one year after the 
temporary regulations became effective, is A 
grandfathered under the existing Code Sec. 
752 regulations because the guarantee was 
"undertaken pursuant to a written binding 
contract" entered into before the effective 
date of the temporary regulations? 
111. The following examples illustrate that some taxpayers may 
find that the seven-year transition period is not long 
enough. 
a) Example 6. Before the effective date ofthe 
temporary regulations, A contributed property to a 
partnership subject to debt in excess of basis. To 
obtain an enhanced share of partnership liabilities 
and avoid gain recognition as a result of a deemed 
distribution under Code Sec. 752(b) in excess of 
A's basis in the partnership interest, A enters into a 
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bottom guarantee or DRO. The partnership and A 
also enter into a lockout agreement that generally 
provides that the partnership will not sell the 
contributed property (which would trigger A's gain 
under Code Sec. 704(c)) for a specified period. 
Also, to further protect A's tax defenal, the lockout 
agreement contains debt maintenance provisions 
that obligate the partnership during the same period 
to maintain a specified level of debt that may be 
guaranteed by A. 
[i] As discussed above, if there is a refmancing 
of the debt and A wishes to enter into a 
bottom guarantee or DRO pursuant to the 
debt maintenance agreement, it is unclear 
whether that anangement would be 
grandfathered under the binding contract 
exception of Temp. Reg. § 1.752-2T(l)(2).If 
the specified period extends beyond the 
seven-year transition period, A will be 
denied the benefit of its bargain because of a 
change in the regulations that is not truly 
prospective only. 
[ii] We are familiar with many real-world cases 
in which the specified lockout and period 
exceeds seven years, including those in 
which A is an individual, and the period 
ends only on A's death (at which time the 
tax liability is absolved by virtue of the step-
up in basis at death). 
IV. Other taxpayers may fmd that the seven-year transition rule 
is inadequate because it limits relief to an amount equal to 
the excess of the taxpayer's share of recourse liabilities 
over basis in the partnership interest immediately before the 
temporary regulations become effective. 
a) Example 7. The facts are the same as in Example 6, 
except that the contributed property is depreciable, 
and A enters into the bottom guarantee not because 
A needs an enhanced share of the liabilities at the 
time of contribution, but because A anticipates 
needing an enhanced share in the future. 
[i] This often occurs with contributions of 
depreciable property subject to nonrecourse 
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debt because of the phenomenon known as 
"Code Sec. 704(c) burn-off." Code Sec. 
704( c) burn-off refers to the fact that the 
amount of Code Sec. 704( c) gain on 
depreciable property contributed to a 
partnership declines annually as depreciation 
deductions are claimed. 26 
(a) As the Code Sec. 704(c) gain 
declines annually, so does the 
amount of nonrecourse debt 
allocated to the contributing partner 
under the second tier of Reg. § 1-7 52-
3(a)(2). 
[ii] In the context of the seven-year transition 
rule, the point is that if A has a sufficient 
share of nonrecourse liabilities to avoid gain 
recognition immediately before the effective 
date of the temporary regulations but, 
nevertheless, has guaranteed debt to prevent 
gain recognition in the future from an 
anticipated reduction of nonrecourse 
liabilities, seven-year transition relief will be 
unavailable for the guaranteed liability. 27 
v. Still other taxpayers may find that the rule terminating 
seven-year transition relief when there is a change in 
ownership to a transition partner that is a partnership causes 
them to lose relief as a result of events they cannot control. 
a) Example 8. A is a 49-percent partner, and B is a 
51-percent partner, in an upper-tier partnership 
(UTP). UTP is a 30-percent partner in a lower-tier 
partnership (LTP). To maintain an enhanced share 
of LTP liabilities, UTP has entered into a bottom 
guarantee of specified LTP liabilities. Further, A 
26Reg. §1.704-3(a)(3)(9)(ii). See generally Blake D. Rubin & Andrea M. Whiteway, Maldng Section 704(c) Sing for 
You 66 N.Y.U. FEDERAL TAX INSTITUTE, ch. 9 (2008). 
27To illustrate, immediately before the effective date of the Temporary Regulations, A might have a negative $100 
tax basis capital account, $100 share of nonrecomse liabilities and $20 share of recomse liabilities on account of a 
guarantee entered into to prevent futme gain recognition, as A's Code Sec. 704(c) gain bums off and A's share of 
nonrecourse liabilities declines. A's tax basis in the interest would be $20, and the seven-year transition rule would 
be inapplicable because A's $20 share of recourse liabilities does not exceed the basis in its interest. Relief might be 
available initially under the general effective date rule of Temporary Reg. §1.752-2T(l)(2) but would be lost if the 
debt subject to the guarantee were refinanced. 
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and B have each entered into a capital contribution 
obligation requiring that ifUTP must pay on its 
guarantee, A will contribute 49 percent, and B will 
contribute 51 percent of the required funds to UTP, 
B sells its interest to C, which also assumes B's 
capital contribution obligation. 
[i] Under Temp. Reg. § 1. 752-2T(l)(3)(ii), A 
loses the benefit of the seven-year transition 
rule and recognizes gain on account of a 
deemed distribution under Code Sec. 752(b) 
that exceeds the basis in A's interest. 28 Thus, 
A loses the benefit of the seven-year 
transition rule even though its payment 
obligation is unchanged, there is no change 
in the partnership liability, and it has no 
control over B 's sale. 
(a) The policy justification for this 
seems pmticularly opaque, even 
under a set of temporary regulations 
whose policy justification is obscure 
at best. 
c. As illustrated by the examples above, the application of the 
effective date and transition relief in real world transactions is far 
from clear, and taxpayers may find themselves in situations where 
they m·e losing allocations of pmtnership liabilities while they 
continue to bear the real economic risk of loss for such liabilities 
under the temporary regulations. 
E. CODE SEC. 752 PROPOSED REGULATIONS 
1. Overview 
a. The Existing Regulations set fmth an anti-abuse rule pursuant to 
which an obligation of a partner is not recognized if the facts and 
circumstances indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the 
obligation. 29 
28Even if the anangement might otherwise be grandfathered under the general effective date rule of Temporary Reg. 
§ 1.752-2T(1)(2), it appears that that status would be lost as a result of the technical termination ofUTP that would 
occur under Code Sec. 708(b )(1 )(B). New UTP would not have incurred any liability or payment obligation prior to 
the effective date. The relief for technical terminations provided by the general effective date mle of Temporary 
Reg. § 1. 752-2T(1)(3)(B) applies only for purposes of the seven-year transition rule. 
29Reg. § 1.752-2(j)(3). 
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i. The sole example in the Existing Regulations illustrating 
the application of this rule involves a corporate subsidiary 
that is formed with $0 net worth apart from its interest in a 
partnership to guarantee a partnership liability in order to 
allow the consolidated tax return group to enjoy losses 
from the partnership property. 
b. Proposed Reg. § 1.752-2(j)(3) expands this anti-abuse rule to 
include a nonexclusive list of factors that may indicate a plan to 
circumvent or avoid a payment obligation. The proposed 
regulations provide that the presence or absence of any factor is 
not necessarily indicative of whether a payment obligation is or is 
not recognized and the weight to be given to any particular factor 
depends on the particular case. The factors include the following: 
1. The partner or related person is not subject to commercially 
reasonable contractual restrictions that protect the 
likelihood of payment, including, for example, restrictions 
on transfers for inadequate consideration or distributions by 
the partner or related person to equity owners in the partner 
or related person. 
11. The partner or related person is not required to provide 
(either at the time the payment obligation is made or 
periodically) commercially reasonable documentation 
regarding the partner's or related person's financial 
condition to the benefited party. 30 
111. The term of the payment obligation ends prior to the term 
of the partnership liability, or the pminer or related person 
has a right to terminate its payment obligation, if the 
purpose of limiting the duration of the payment obligation 
is to terminate such payment obligation prior to the 
occurrence of an event or events that increase the risk of 
economic loss to the guarantor or benefited patiy. 31 
IV. There exists a plan or arrangement in which the primary 
obligor or any other obligor (or a person related to the 
3<Note that in order to avoid this factor, it appears to be necessary to impose an obligation to provide such 
documentation both at inception of the obligation and periodically thereafter. 
31Proposed Reg. § 1. 752-20)(3) clarifies that "[t]his factor typically will not be present if the termination of the 
obligation occurs by reason of an event or events that decrease the risk of economic loss to the guarantor or 
benefited party (for example, the payment obligation terminates upon the completion of a building construction 
project, upon the leasing of a building, or when cetiain income and asset coverage ratios are satisfied for a specified 
number of quarters)." 
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obligor) with respect to the partnership liability directly or 
indirectly holds money or other liquid assets in an amount 
that exceeds the reasonable foreseeable needs of such 
obligor. 
v. The payment obligation does not pemlit the creditor to 
promptly pursue payment following a payment default on 
the pminership liability, or other anangements with respect 
to the partnership liability or payment obligation otherwise 
indicate a plan to delay collection. 
v1. In the case of a guarantee or similar arrangement, the tem1s 
of the partnership liability would be substantially the Sallle 
had the partner or related person not agreed to provide the 
guarantee. 
vn. The creditor or other party benefiting from the obligation 
did not receive executed documents with respect to the 
payment obligation from the pminer or related person 
before, or within a commercially reasonable petiod oftin1e 
after, the creation of the obligation.32 
c. Since 2006, Reg. §1.752-2(k) of the Existing Regulations has 
provided that the owner of a disregarded entity (such as a single-
owner LLC) will be treated as bearing the economic risk of loss for 
a partnership liability only to the extent of the net value of the 
disregarded entity, as defmed in the Existing Regulations. 
1. In general, the "net value" of the disregarded entity is equal 
to fair market value of its assets less its liabilities, 
disregarding the value of its interest in the pminership 
whose liabilities are being allocated. The point is to 
recogtlize that, although the owner of the disregarded entity 
is the taxpayer affected by partnersllip liability allocations, 
the state law liability shield provided by the disregarded 
entity effectively precludes the taxpayer from bearing any 
economic risk of loss beyond the net value of the 
disregarded entity. 
11. The proposed regulations would elinlinate this regime 
applicable for disregarded entities that are partners and 
substitute a much broader mle applicable to all pminers. 
Specifically, the proposed regulations provide that: 
32Proposed Reg. §1.752-2(j)(3)(ii). 
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Evidence of a plan to circumvent or avoid an 
obligation is deemed to exist if the facts and 
circumstances indicate that there is not a reasonable · 
expectation that the payment obligor will have the 
ability to make the required payments if the 
payment obligation becomes due and payable ... 33 
2. Issues Raised by Proposed Regulations 
a. The first two factors require commercially reasonable financial 
documentation and commercially reasonable restrictions on 
transfer of the obligor's assets. 
1. Although the determination of what is "commercially 
reasonable" is likely unclear in many situations, as a 
practical matter taxpayers could likely avoid falling afoul 
of these factors by inserting "magic language" in the 
documents creating the obligation. 
b. The third factor looks to whether the term of the pa)'ment 
obligation ends or can be terminated prior to the partnership's 
obligation payment obligation becoming due and payable, if the 
purpose of limiting the duration of the payment obligation is to 
terminate it prior to the occurrence of an event that increases the 
risk of the obligor. 
i. This is consistent with the view that partners should not be 
able to eliminate their recourse liability when the likelihood 
of having to pay increases and should be interpreted to 
allow early termination of the obligation where the purpose 
is not to terminate it prior to an event that increases the 
obligor's risk, such as in the situation described in Example 
9. 
33Proposed Reg. §1.752-2(j)(3)(iii). 
a) Example 9. A real estate loan is required by the 
lender to be fully guaranteed by a partner. The 
partner is allowed to sell his interest in the 
partnership to a credit-worthy purchaser who 
guarantees the loan, in which case the original 
partner-guarantor has the right to be released from 
the guarantee. This should not fall afoul of the third 
factor because the purpose is not to terminate the 
25 
obligation prior to an event that increases the 
obligor's risk. 
c. The fourth faCtor looks to whether the partnership is holding 
money or other liquid assets in excess of its reasonably foreseeable 
needs. 
1. Under the Existing Regulations, in applying the 
constructive liquidation test, all assets including cash held 
by the partnership are deemed to be worthless. 
11. . Under the proposed regulations, in cases where a 
pminership holds significant liquid assets, the fourth factor 
will create the risk of disagreement over whether such 
holdings are in excess of reasonably foreseeable needs. 
d. The fifth factor looks to whether there are limitations on the ability 
of the creditor to promptly pursue payment following a payment 
default on the pminership liability, or other arrangements that 
indicate a plan to delay collection. 
1. Any guarantee of collection is arguably afoul ofthis factor. 
As noted above, a guarantee of collection requires that the 
creditor pursue its remedies againstthe bcmower and the 
collateral prior to pursuing the guarantor. These 
anangements are commonplace in secured real estate 
lending transactions that are entered into for non-tax 
reasons, and the treatment of such anangements as 
evidencing a plan or arrangement to avoid the obligation is 
misguided. 
e. Even more troubling is the sixth factor, which looks to whether the 
loan terms would be "substantially the same" without the payment 
obligation. 
1. Presumably, avoiding this factor will require the taxpayer 
to demonstrate that it received better loan terms by virtue of 
the presence of the payment obligation. Indeed, the 
language suggests that the loan tenns must be 
"substantially" better. A voiding this factor will require the 
taxpayer to demonstrate what the loan terms would be with 
and without the guarantee, which in many cases will be 
challenging. 
11. Moreover, the extent to which the loan tetms were or were 
not improved due to the payment obligation does not seem 
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to have any bearing on whether the taxpayer has a plan or 
intention to avoid the obligation. 34 
111. Apparently, any guarantee that is created after the inception 
of the loan, even though legally enforceable, will be afoul 
ofthis factor. 
f. The seventh factor is that the creditor or other party benefiting 
from the obligation did not receive executed documents with 
respect to the payment obligation from the partner or related 
person before, or within a commercially reasonable period oftime 
after, the creation of the obligation. 
1. Frankly, we believe that the requirement that the creditor 
receive executed documents is inherent under existing law 
and required to conclude that the payment obligation is 
legally enforceable, which of course is required for it to be 
taken into account for tax purposes. 
g. Unlike the objective and administrable rules ofthe Existing 
Regulations, the first, second, fourth and sixth factors require a 
determination of the meaning of the terms "commercially 
reasonable," "reasonable needs" and "substantially the same." 
1. These amorphous and subjective tests will require partners 
and partnerships to make difficult, if not impossible, 
judgments in order to determine whether a particular 
obligation can be taken into account. 
11. Given the amorphous and subjective nature ofthese tests, 
we expect that IRS agents will challenge many payment 
obligations on the grounds that the commercially 
reasonable, reasonable needs, or substantially the same 
factors are not met, if a challenge would result in an 
increase in tax. 
111. We are particularly disappointed that the proposed 
regulations would require a subjective analysis of an 
obligation for it to be taken into account, given the public 
34The Preamble to the Proposed Regulations states that the fact that the loan terms were not improved by agreeing to 
the payment obligation indicates that the guarantee was not required by lender. Of course, it might also indicate that 
the lender was not willing to make the loan without the guarantee (which might raise issues under Plantation 
Patterns Inc., 29 TCM 817, Dec. 30,219(M), TC Memo. 1970-182, aff'd, CA-5, 72-2 USTC ~9494, 462 F2d 712). In 
any case, the presence or absence of this factor does not bear on whether there is a plan to avoid the obligation. 
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statements by the IRS and Treasury representatives 
preceding the issuance of the earlier proposed regulations 
that any new rules concerning such a determination under 
Code Sec. 752 would be objective and mechanical.35 
h. Most troubling of all is the per se rule in Proposed Reg. § 1. 7 52-
2G)(3)(iii) that a plan to circumvent a payment obligation is 
deemed to exist if the facts and circumstances indicate that there is 
not a reasonable expectation that the payment obligor will have the 
ability to make the required payments if the payment obligation 
becomes due and payable (the "Reasonable Expectation 
Requirement"). 
1. The other factors discussed above are nonexclusive and to 
be given varying weight depending on the facts and 
circumstances. In contrast, failure to meet the Reasonable 
Expectation Requirement automatically results in a deemed 
plan to circumvent the obligation, which automatically 
results in the obligation being disregarded. 
11. The Reasonable Expectation Requirement is entirely 
inconsistent with the so-called presumption of solvency in 
the Existing Regulations that an obligor will perfom1 on its 
obligations irrespective of its net worth set fmih in Reg. 
§1.752-2. 
a) The proposed regulations do not explicitly amend 
the presumption of solvency, so it is unclear how 
the presumption of solvency is intended to co-exist 
with the Reasonable Expectation Requirement. 
b) The Reasonable Expectation Requirement would 
place an affrm1ative burden on the obligor to 
establish that an expectation of satisfaction of a 
payment obligation is reasonable, which defeats the 
purpose of and is inconsistent with the presumption 
of solvency. It is the exception that completely 
undoes the general rule of the presumption of 
solvency, rather than proving the general rule. 
35See Elliott, Guarantors May Need to Document Net Worth, Katz Says, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 30,2013, at 1528 
("Craig Gerson, attorney-advisor, Treasmy Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, said the government is designing the 
test in the regs to be mechanical in nature," and Clifford Wanen, senior counsel for the Service's Office of 
Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries), "added that the government is trying to avoid using 
phrases like 'business purpose' and 'commercially reasonable' in the gnidance. 'We want it to be a more objective 
test, to be fi·ank. We don't want to be litigating about what's right and what's wrong in this area,' he said."). 
28 
111. While failure to meet the Reasonable Expectation 
Requirement results automatically in disregarding a 
payment obligation, determining whether the Reasonable 
Expectation Requirement is met in a particular case could 
hardly be more uncertain. 
a) To begin with, what level of probability or 
likelihood of payment needs to be present in order 
to conclude that there is a "reasonable expectation 
that the payment obligor will have the ability to 
make the required payments if the payment 
obligation becomes due and payable"? Lacking any 
guidance on this point-and there is none-one 
could argue as plausibly for a 10-percent likelihood 
of payment as for a 90-percent likelihood, or 
anywhere in between. 
b) Whatever the required likelihood, when is it 
measured? At the time the payment obligation is 
entered into? At the end of every year that the 
payment obligation is taken into account for 
purposes of Code Sec. 752? At any time that there 
is a change in expectation? 
c) What does it mean to "have the ability to make the 
required payments if the obligation becomes due 
and payable"? Does that require an ability to pay all 
principal in the event of default, or only to pay 
regular debt service as it comes due? How does one 
prove the reasonable expectation? Will all 
guarantors be required to tender to the IRS 
comprehensive financial statements to demonstrate 
the ability to pay? 
d) The issues are legion, and we foresee that IRS 
auditors will use the massive uncertainty inherent in 
the Reasonable Expectation Requirement, together 
with the draconian consequences of violating it, to 
hammer taxpayers. 
F. CODE SEC. 704(B) PROPOSED REGULATIONS 
1. As part of this same regulatory package, Treasury issued proposed 
regulations under Code Sec. 704(b) (the "Code Sec. 704(b) Proposed 
Regulations"). While a detailed discussion of these changes is beyond the 
scope of this outline, some mention is appropriate because of their 
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relationship to the Code Sec. 752 temporary regulations and proposed 
regulations. 
2. The Code Sec. 704(b) Proposed Regulations would make changes to the 
Code Sec. 704(b) regulations regarding when a DRO is respected that 
conespond to the provisions of the temporary regulations and proposed 
regulations. 
a. The first change, corr-esponding to the temporary regulations, is 
that a DRO would not be respected if it is disregarded BDP0.36 
b. The second change in the Code Sec. 704(b) Proposed Regulations, 
corr-esponding to the Code Sec. 752 proposed regulations, is that a 
DRO would not be recognized if the facts and circumstances 
indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the obligation. 
1. As with the Code Sec. 752 regulations, the Code Sec. 
704(b) Proposed Regulations include a nonexclusive list of 
factors that may indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the 
obligation.37 
n. The Code Sec. 704(b) Proposed Regulations provide that 
the presence or absence of any factor is not necessarily 
indicative of whether a payment obligation is or is not 
recognized, and the weight to be given to any particular 
factor depends on the patiicular case. Proposed Reg. 
§ 1.704-l(b )(2)(ii)(C)( 4)(B) includes the following factors: 
a) The partner is not subject to commercially 
reasonable provisions for enforcement and 
collection of the obligation. 
b) The partner is not required to provide (either at the 
time the obligation is made or periodically) 
commercially reasonable documentation regarding 
the partner's financial condition to the patinership. 
c) The obligation ends or could, by its terms, be 
te1minated before the liquidation of the partner's 
36Proposed Reg. § 1. 704-1 (b )(2)(ii)( c)( 4)(A). As discussed above, unfortunately, the Temporary Regulations do not 
provide any guidance to detennine whether a DRO is a BDPO. Reg. § 1. 704-2(m), Example I (vii} specifically 
addresses the consequences of a "bottom" guarantee on the computation of "minimum gain" under the Code Sec. 
704(b) regulations, but does not in any way suggest that the "bottom" guarantee is illusory or should be disregarded. 
Presumably due to a technical oversight, the Code Sec. 704(b) Proposed Regulations would not make any change to 
that example. 
37Proposed Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c)(4)(B). 
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interest in the partnership or when the partner's 
capital account as provided in Reg. § 1. 7 04-
l(b)(2)(iv) is negative. 
d) The terms of the obligation are not provided to all 
the partners in the partnership in a timely manner. 
111. A common provision in partnership agreements that have 
DROs is that a partner having a DRO can transfer his 
partnership interest if the transferee agrees to the same 
DRO. Such a provision would presumably fall afoul of the 
factor in Proposed Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(C)(4)(B)(iii). 
IV. Another concern is that the effective date of the Code Sec. 
704(b) Proposed Regulations is that the new rules would 
"apply on or after the date these regulations are published 
as final regulations in the Federal Register." Thus, there is 
no transition relief for binding DROs that were entered into 
before the date the Code Sec. 704(b) Proposed Regulations 
were published. 
v. Partners who entered into DROs in reliance on the existing 
Code Sec. 704(b) regulations could find that those DROs 
cease to be taken into account because the various factors 
listed in Proposed Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(4)(B) are not 
met. Putting aside the merits of the proposed changes to the 
Code Sec. 704(b) regulations, the failure to provide 
transition relief for pre-existing DROs is entirely 
inappropriate. 
G. CONCLUSION 
1. Managing the allocation of partnership liabilities is critical to achieving a 
partner's tax planning goals. The amendments to the partnership debt 
allocation rules in the temporary regulations and proposed regulations are 
among the most significant changes in partnership tax law in more than 20 
years. In many cases, the changes would result in the recognition of 
taxable gain by partners or limit partners' ability to take losses into 
account as a result of a reduction in their allocable share of partnership 
liabilities. 
2. In contrast to the existing regulations on the allocation of partnership 
recourse liabilities, which are largely mechanical and administrable, the 
proposed regulations would impose unclear, subjective, and in some cases, 
noncommercial requirements on payment obligations commonly entered 
into by partners in order for those obligations to be taken into account 
under Code Sec. 752. 
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3. We suggest that both the temporary regulations and the proposed 
regulations under Code Sec. 752 be withdrawn. We believe that the 
changes to the Code Sec. 707 regulations that were published at the same 
time adequately addressed Treasury's concerns about the use of debt 
allocations to avoid gain in leveraged partnership and other similar 
transactions, and that these further changes impose an entirely 
unworkable, unnecessary and burdensome regime on every partnership 
and partnership liability that is inconsistent with sound tax policy. 
ill. TEMPORARY REGULATIONS UNDER CODE SEC. 707 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. It is widely understood that the original motivation for the revisions to the 
Code Sec. 752 regulations was to limit taxpayers' ability to stmcture a so-
called "leveraged partnership" transaction that complies with the debt-
financed distribution exception to the partnership disguised sale mles 
under Code Sec. 707.38 
2. The proposed Code Sec. 752 regulations issued on January 29, 201439 (the 
"20 14 Proposed Regulations") actually did little to curtail leveraged 
partnership transactions, and in response to comments on those proposed 
regulations, the temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation directly and 
effectively addresses the issue. 
3. The basic mle of the temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation is that a 
partner's share of a liability for purposes of the disguised sale mles is 
determined by reference to the partner's share of partnership profits. 
a. This mle applies regardless of whether the liability is a recourse 
liability for which the partner bears the economic risk of loss under 
the Code Sec. 752 regulations, which is a major departure from the 
prior regulations under Code Sec. 707. 
B. PARTNERSHIP DISGUISED SALES: IN GENERAL 
1. Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) provides that, if: 
38Amy S. Elliott, TreaSUIJi Officials Explain New Bottom-Dollar Guarantee Rules, 2014 TNT 38-4 (Mar. 3, 2014) 
(quoting Lisa Zarlenga, Treasury Tax Legislative Counsel, as saying "When we were conside1ing changes in the 
Code Sec. 752 rules related to [the debt-financed distribution] exception, we determined that certain principles that 
were being applied for just Code Sec. 707 purposes ought to apply equally in non-disguised sale cases"). 
39REG-119305-11. For a discussion of the 2014 Proposed Regulations, see Blake D. Rubin, Andrea M. Whiteway & 
Jon G. Finkelstein, Proposed Partnership Liability Allocation Regulations: An Unworkable Solution in Search of a 
Problem, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, July-August 2014, at 41. 
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a. There is a direct or indirect transfer of money or other property by 
a partner to a partnership; 
b. There is a related direct or indirect transfer of money or other 
property by the partnership to such partner (or another partner); 
and 
c. The transfers described in clauses (i) and (ii), when viewed 
together, are properly characterized as a sale or exchange of 
property, 
such transfers shall be treated either as a transaction occurring between the 
partnership and one who is not a partner, or as a transaction between two 
or more partners acting other than in their capacity as members of the 
partnership. 
2. Similarly, the regulations under Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) provide: 
a. A transfer of property (excluding money or an obligation to 
contribute money) by a partner to a partnership and a transfer of 
money or other consideration (including the assumption of or the 
taking subject to a liability) by the partnership to the partner 
constitute a sale of property, in whole or in part, by the partner to 
the partnership only if based on all the facts and circumstances: 
i. The transfer of money or other consideration would not 
have been made but for the transfer of property; and 
n. In cases in which the transfers are not made 
simultaneously, the subsequent transfer is not dependent on 
the entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations.40 
3. The regulations under Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) also deal with the treatment 
of liabilities. The Senate Report relating to the disguised sale legislation in 
1984 provided direction regarding the treatment of liabilities: 
40Reg, §1.707-3(b). 
The disguised sale provision also will apply to the extent (1) the 
transferor partner receives the proceeds of a loan related to the 
property to the extent responsibility for the repayment of the loan 
rests, directly or indirectly, with the partnership (or its assets) or 
the partners, or (2) the partner has received a loan related to the 
property in anticipation of the transaction and responsibility for 
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repayment of the loan is transferred, directly or indirectly, to the 
partnership (or its assets) or the other partners _41 
4. The Conference Report relating to the disguised sale legislation in 1985 
(the "Conference Report") contemplated an analysis of who (or whose 
assets) bears responsibility for the repayment of a loan for purposes of 
determining whether (1) a partnership's distlibution to a contributing 
partner of the proceeds ()fa partnership liability or (2) a partnership's 
assumption of, or taking subject to a contributing partner's liability, 
constitutes a disguised sale. 
5. Regarding the former case, the Conference Report elaborated: 
The conferees wish to note that when a partner of a partnership 
contributes property to the partnership and that property is 
borrowed against, pledged as collateral for a loan, or otherwise 
refmanced, and the proceeds of the loan are distributed to the 
cmitributing partner, there will be no disguised sale under the 
provision to the extent the contributing partner, in substance, 
retains liability for repayment of the borrowed amounts (i.e., to the 
extent the other partners have no direct or indirect risk of loss with 
respect to such amounts) since, in effect, the partner has simply 
borrowed through the partnership. However, to the extent the other 
pminers directly or indirectly bear the risk ofloss with respect to 
the borrowed amounts, this may constitute a payment to the 
contributing partner. 42 
6. The regulations under Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) establish a general rule for 
situations in which a partnership assumes or takes subject to a contributing 
pminer's liability that reflects the framework provided in the Conference 
Repmi. Specifically, Reg. §1.707-5(a)(l) provides: 
For purposes of this section and §§1.707-3 and 1.707-4, ... if the 
pminership assumes or takes property subject to a liability of the 
paliner other than a qualified liability, the palinership is treated as 
transferring consideration to the paliner to the extent that the 
amount of the liability exceeds the pminer's share of that liability 
in1lllediately after the partnership assumes or takes subject to the 
41 S. Rep. No. 98-169 (P.L. 98-369) at 321 (1984). 
42H.R. Rep. No. 98-861, at 862 (1984). 
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liability as provided in paragraphs (a)(2), (3) and (4) ofthis 
section.43 
7. Similarly, the regulations under Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) implement the 
"borrowing through the partnership" exception to disguised sale treatment. 
Specifically, Reg. § 1. 707 -5(b )(2) provides: 
For purposes of § 1. 7 07-3, if a partner transfers property to a 
partnership, and the partnership incurs a liability and all or a 
portion of the proceeds of that liability are allocable under § 1.163-
8T to a transfer of money or other consideration to the partner 
made within 90 days of incurring the liability, the transfer of 
money or other consideration to the partner is taken into account 
only to the extent that the amount of money or the fair market 
value of the other consideration transferred exceeds that partner's 
allocable share of the partnership liability. 
8. The language from the Conference Report regarding "responsibility for 
the repayment of the loan" was incorporated into the regulations under 
Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) through the concept of a partner's "share" of a 
liability in Reg. § 1.707-5(a)(1). 
9. The regime for determining a partner's share of a liability was 
fundamentally revised by the temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation. To 
understand this change, it is helpful first to review the rules that preceded 
the temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation. 
C. LIABILITIES UNDER THE PRIOR DISGUISED SALE REGULATIONS 
1. Under the prior disguised sale regulations, before the temporary Code Sec. 
707 regulation, an initial distinction was made between a recourse and a 
nonrecourse liability by reference to the regulations under Code Sec. 752. 
a. Regarding a recourse liability, the prior disguised sale regulations 
provided: 
A partner's share of a recourse liability of the partnership 
equals the partner's share of the liability under the rules of 
section 752 and the regulations thereunder. A partnership 
liability is a recourse liability to the extent that the 
obligation is a recourse liability under §1.752-l(a)(1) or 
43This column does not deal with a partnership's assumption of, or taking subject to "qualified liabilities," which 
generally are not treated as giving rise to consideration in a disguised sale unless they are assumed or taken subject 
to, in connection with a transaction otherwise treated as a disguised sale. 
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would be treated as a recourse liability under that section if 
it were treated as a partnership liability for purposes of that 
section.44 
b. Regarding a nonrecourse liability, the prior disguised sale 
regulations provided: 
A partner's share of a nonrecourse liability of the 
partnership is determined by applying the same percentage 
used to determine the partner's share of the excess 
nonrecourse liability under § 1. 7 52-3 (a )(3). A partnership 
liability is a nonrecourse liability of the partnership to the 
extent that the obligation is a nonrecourse liability under 
§ 1.752-l(a)(2) or would be a nonrecourse liability of the 
partnership under §1.752-l(a)(2) if it were treated as a 
partnership liability for purposes of that section. 45 
2. As discussed above, under the Code Sec. 752 regulations, a partnership 
liability is a recourse liability to the extent a partner bears the "economic 
risk of loss" for the liability, and a recourse liability is allocated to the 
patiner that bears the economic risk ofloss.46 A partnership liability is a 
nonrecourse liability to the extent no patiner is treated as bearing the 
economic risk of loss for the liability. 47 
3. Also as discussed above, the Code Sec. 752 regulations establish a three-
tier system for allocating nonrecourse liabilities. 
a. The prior disguised sale regulations provided that a patiner's share 
of a nonrecourse liability was dete1mined by applying the same 
percentage used to determine the partner's share of the "excess 
nonrecourse liability" under the Code Sec. 752 regulations (i.e., the 
excess of the liability that is not allocated pursuant to the first or 
second tier). 48 
44Prior Reg. §1.707-5(a)(2)(i). 
45Prior Reg. §1.707-5(a)(2)(ii). 
46Reg. §1.752-l(a)(l) and Reg. §1.751-2(a). 
47Reg. § 1. 752-l(a)(2). 
48Plior Reg. § 1.707 -5( a)(2)(ii). The first and second tiers (often referred to as the "minimum gain" tier and the 
"Section 704(c) minimum gain" tier) generally allocate a pmtion of the nomecourse liability to pattners that would 
be allocated gain pursuant to a minimum gain chargeback or Code Sec. 704(c) if the property were disposed of 
solely in satisfaction of the nomecourse liability. 
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4. The general rule for excess nomecourse liabilities is that they are allocated 
in accordance with a partner's share of (or interest in) partnership profits 
(the "General Rule"). 49 In general, a partner's interest in partnership 
profits is determined "by taking into account all facts and circumstances 
relating to the economic arrangement of the partners."50 
5. As described above, the Code Sec. 752 regulations also provide certain 
specific methods for determining a partner's interest in partnership profits. 
a. The partnership agreement may specify a partner's interest in 
partnership profits in a manner that is "reasonably consistent with 
allocations (that have substantial economic effect under the section 
704(b) regulations) of some other significant item of partnership 
income or gain" (the "Significant Item Method"). 51 
b. Also, a partnership may allocate an excess nomecourse liability "in 
accordance with the manner in which it is reasonably expected that 
the deductions attributable to those nomecourse liabilities will be 
allocated" (the "Alternative Method"). 
c. Finally, there is also an "Additional Method," which allows the 
excess nomecourse liability to be allocated to a partner up to the 
amount of built-in gain that would be allocated to the partner under 
Code Sec. 704(c) (or Code Sec. 704( c) principles if the property 
has been revalued under the Code Sec. 704(b) regulations) if the 
property subject to the liability were sold to the extent such built-in 
gain exceeds the built-in gain taken into account in the second tier. 
6. Under the prior Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) regulations, the Significant Item 
Method and the Alternative Method were available for purposes of 
determining a partner's share of a nomecourse liability, in addition to the 
General Rule. The Additional Method was not permitted to be used for 
purposes of the disguised sale regulations. 52 
7. With this framework, the following is a simplified example ofhow a 
leveraged partnership transaction could work under the prior disguised 
sale regulations, before the temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation: 
a. Example 10. A transfers property X, with a fair market value of 
$100, to partnership AB. B transfers $95 of other property. 
49Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3). 
sold. 
5!Jd. 
52Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3). 
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Immediately after the transfer, AB bonows $95 and distributes the 
proceeds of the bonowing to A. A guarantees the liability so that 
only A bears the economic risk of loss for the liability. Because the 
entire liability is allocable to A, A has not been distributed money 
in excess of A's allocable share of the liability under the prior 
Code Sec. 707 regulations. Accordingly, A receives the $95 as a 
distribution under Code Sec. 731 (a) that is not treated as part of a 
disguised sale and not cunently taxable. 
1. A similar result could be achieved if A encumbered X 
immediately prior to transfening X subject to the liability 
to AB. If A guaranteed the liability so that only A bore the 
economic risk of loss for the liability, then, under the prior 
disguised sale regulations, A's share of the liability after 
the transfer would equal the entire amount of the liability, 
and accordingly none of the liability would be treated as 
consideration received by A in a disguised sale. 
8. In Canal Cmp.,53 the Tax Comi analyzed the application ofthe disguised 
sale mles to a leveraged partnership transaction. Without going into the 
facts, the transaction depended on a liability of the patinership being 
treated as a recourse liability to the partner that received the proceeds of 
the partnership liability. The IRS successfully challenged the transaction 
by assetiing an anti-abuse mle in the Code Sec. 752 regulations. 54 
a. The anti -abuse mle (discussed above) provided that a partner or 
related person's payment obligation may be disregarded if facts 
and circun1stances indicate that a principal purpose of the 
anangement is to eliminate the patiner's or related person's 
economic risk of loss with respect to that obligation or create the 
appearance of the partner or related person bearing the economic 
risk of loss when, in fact, the substance of the anangement is 
otherwise. 55 
9. The preamble to the 2014 Proposed Regulations noted: 
The IRS and the Treasury Depaiiment have considered whether the 
approach of the existing regulations under §1.752-2 is appropriate 
given that, in most cases, a partnership will satisfy its liabilities 
53Canal Corp., 135 TC 199, Dec. 58,298 (2010). 
54The taxpayer in Canal Corp. was in bankruptcy at the time of the Tax Court decision. It did not pursue an appeal 
of the Tax Court decision, and it entered into a settlement with the IRS to settle the $106.7 million judgment for 
about $2 million. For a detailed discussion of the Canal Corp. case, see Blake D. Rubin, Andrea M. Whiteway & 
Jon G. Finkelstein, Tax Court Takes Wrong Turn in Canal, J. P ASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 41. 
55Reg. §1.752-2(j). 
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with partnership profits, the partnership's assets do not become 
worthless, and the payment obligations of partners or related 
persons are not called upon. The IRS and the Treasury Department 
are concerned that some partners or related persons have entered 
into payment obligations that are not commercial solely to achieve 
an allocation of a partnership liability to such partner. 
10. The preamble went on to explain: 
Accordingly, the proposed regulations provide a rule that 
obligations to make a payment with respect to a partnership 
liability (excluding those imposed by state law) will not be 
recognized for purposes of section 752 unless certain factors are 
present. 
11. The 2014 Proposed Regulations would not have upended the basic 
distinction in the treatment of recourse and nonrecourse liabilities under 
the disguised sale regulations. Rather, the regulations would have 
significantly limited the extent to which a liability would be treated as a 
recourse liability primarily by expanding the situations in which a 
payment obligation would be disregarded. 
D. TEMPORARY CODE SEC. 707 REGULATION 
1. The temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation provides the following: 
56Reg. § 1. 707 -5T( a )(2)(i). 
a. For purposes of§ 1.707-5, a partner's share of a liability of a 
partnership, as defined in§ 1.752-1(a) (whether a recourse liability 
or a nonrecourse liability) is determined by applying the same 
percentage used to determine the partner's share of the excess 
nonrecourse liability under§ 1.752-3(a)(3) (as limited in its 
application to this paragraph (a)(2)), but such share shall not 
exceed the partner's share of the partnership liability under section 
752 and applicable regulations (as limited in the application of§ 
1.752-3(a)(3) to this paragraph (a)(2)). 56 
i. This provision replaces the prior regulations that provided 
one rule for recourse liabilities and another for nonrecourse 
liabilities. 
a) As a result, for purposes of the disguised sale rules, 
a partner's share of recourse and nonrecourse 
liabilities is now determined by reference to the 
partner's share of excess nonrecourse liabilities. 
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The preamble to the 2016 Regulations under the 
disguised sale rules explained: 
[T]he Treasury Department and the IRS 
have concluded that, for disguised sale 
purposes only, it is appropriate for partners 
to determine their share of any partnership 
liability, whether recourse or nonrecourse 
under section 752, in the manner in which 
excess nonrecourse liabilities are allocated 
under Sec. 1.752-3(a)(3), as limited for 
disguised sale purposes in the 752 Final 
Regulations. 
b. In connection with Temporary Code Sec. 707 Regulation, the IRS 
also revised the language of the "third tier" in Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3), 
so that it provides, "The significant item method, altemative 
method, and additional method do not apply for purposes of 
§ 1.707-5(a)(2)." 
1. As a result, for purposes of the disguised sale rules, a 
partner's share of a liability is therefore dete1mined only by 
reference to the General Rule for excess nonrecourse 
liabilities (i.e., the Significant Item Method and the 
Altemative Method are no longer available). 57 
2. The consequences of the temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation can be 
illustrated by applying it to the same example used above: 
a. Example 11. A transfers property X, with a fair market value of 
$100, to partnership AB. B transfers $95 of other property. 
Immediately after the transfer, AB encumbers X with a $95 
liability and distributes the proceeds of the borrowing to A. A 
guarantees the liability so that only A bears the economic risk of 
loss for the liability. Assume A's share ofpminership profits is 
5%. Therefore, A's share of the liability is $5. The remaining $90 
is in excess of A's allocable share of the liability. Accordingly, A 
receives the $90 of taxable consideration as part of a disguised sale 
ofXtoAB. 
1. In this case, A's guarantee of the liability is not relevant for 
the disguised sale analysis. Under the same facts, if A had 
57For a discussion ofiRS's concem with the use of these methods in the disguised sale context, see Blake D. Rubin 
& Andrea M. Whiteway, Here Comes the Kitchen Sink: IRS Throws 'Eve1ything But' at Two Partnership Tax 
Deferral Structures, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, Mar.-Apr. 2003. 
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not guaranteed the liability, A's allocable share of the 
liability would still be $5 based on A's 5% share of AB's 
profits. The result would also be the same if A encumbered 
X with a $95 liability in anticipation of the contribution, 
contributed X to AB subject to the liability, and guaranteed 
the liability. 
3. The preamble to the 2014 Proposed Regulations noted that Treasury and 
the IRS "are aware of the difficulty in determining a partner's interest in 
partnership profits in other than very simple partnerships and, therefore, 
recognize the need to have a bright-line measure of a partner's interest in 
partnership profits." 
a. The 2014 Proposed Regulations proposed looking to a partner's 
proportionate share of the partnership on a liquidation basis as a 
bright-line test for measuring a partner's share of partnership 
profits. Commenters raised numerous and significant problems 
with the liquidation approach to the allocation of excess 
nomecourse liabilities (summarized in the preamble to the 2016 
Regulations), and the IRS abandoned this proposal in the 2016 
Regulations. 
b. The Treasury did not, however, provide an alternative bright-line 
test in the 2016 Regulations for determining a partner's interest in 
partnership profits. The observation in the preamble to the 2014 
Proposed Regulations about the difficulty in many circumstances 
of determining a partner's interest in partnership profits remains 
valid, and the significance of this determination has been greatly 
increased by the Temporary Code Sec. 707 Regulation by causing 
this standard to be applicable to all liabilities for purposes of the 
disguised sale mles. 
4. The regulations under Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) take account of a situation 
in which a partner's share of a liability changes, dealing with a so-called 
"anticipatory reduction." This mle provides: 
a. For purposes of this section, a partner's share of a liability, 
immediately after a partnership assumes or takes property subject 
to the liability, is determined by taking into account a subsequent 
reduction in the partner's share if: 
1. At the time that the partnership assumes or takes property 
subject to the liability, it is anticipated that the transferring 
partner's share of the liability will be subsequently reduced; 
11. The anticipated reduction is not subject to the 
entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations; and 
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111. The reduction of the partner's share of the liability is part 
of a plan that has as one of its principal purposes 
minimizing the extent to which the assumption of or taking 
property subject to the liability is treated as part of a sale 
under § 1. 707-3.58 
5. Clause (ii) was added as part of the 2016 Regulations. The 2016 
Regulations revise an example in the regulations providing an illustration 
of the anticipatory reduction rule. 59 The example can be summarized as 
follows: 
58Reg. §1.707-5(a)(3). 
a. Example 12. C transfers property Y to a partnership in which C 
has a 50% interest. At the time of its transfer to the pminership, 
property Y has a fair market value of $10,000,000 and is subject to 
an $8,000,000 liability. Property Y is a fully leased office building, 
the rental income from prope1ty Y is sufficient to meet debt 
service, and the remaining term of the liability is 10 years. Under 
Code Sec. 752, immediately after the partnership's assumption of 
the liability encumbering property Y, the liability is a recourse 
liability of the partnership, and C's share of that liability is 
$8,000,000. For disguised sale purposes, C's share of the liability 
immediately after the partnership's assumption is $4,000,000 (50% 
of $8,000,000). It is anticipated that, three years after the 
partnership's assumption of the liability, C's share of the liability 
for disguised sale purposes will be reduced to $2,000,000 because 
of a shift in the allocation of partnership profits pursuant to the 
te1ms of the partnership agreement, which provide that C's share 
of the partnership profits will be 25% at that time. 
Under the partnership agreement, this shift in the allocation of 
partnership profits is dependent solely on the passage of time. 
Therefore, if the reduction in C' s share of the liability was 
anticipated at the time of C' s transfer, was not subject to the 
entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations, and was part of a 
plan that has as one of its principal purposes minimizing the extent 
of sale treatment under Reg. § 1. 707-3 (that is, a principal purpose 
of allocating a larger percentage of profits to C in the first three 
years when profits were not likely to be realized was to minimize 
the extent to which C' s transfer would be treated as part of a sale), 
C's share of the liability immediately after the partnership's 
assumption is treated as equal to C's reduced share of $2,000,000. 
Thus, the amount of consideration to Cis $6,000,000 (the excess 
59Reg. §1.707-ST(f), Example 3. 
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of the liability assumed by the partnership ($8,000,000) over C's 
share of the liability for disguised sale purposes immediately after 
the assumption ($2,000,000)), taking into account the anticipated 
reduction in C' s share of the liability pursuant to the terms of the 
partnership agreement. 
i. This example implies that, in the absence of the 
anticipatory reduction rule, C' s share of partnership profits, 
and therefore C's share of the liability, would have been 
50%. Thus, the example implies that the subsequent 
reduction inC's profit share is ignored for purposes of 
determining C's share of profits under the General Rule. 
11. Needless to say, this "snapshot" approach to determining 
C's share of profits is not the only plausible way to make 
that determination. For example, commentators have 
suggested that the determination might be based on the 
partner's anticipated share of overall partnership profits 
·over the life of the partnership. 60 
6. The temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation generally looks to a partner's 
share of partnership profits in determining the partner's share of a liability, 
but there is a limitation at the end of the provision, which provides, "such 
share shall not exceed the partner's share of the partnership liability under 
section 752 and applicable regulations (as limited in the application of§ 
1.752-3(a)(3) to this paragraph (a)(2))" (the "Code Sec. 752 
Limitation"). 61 
7. The application of the Code Sec. 752 Limitation can be illustrated as 
follows: 
a. Example 13. C transfers property X, with a fair market value of 
$100, to partnership AB. Immediately after the transfer, AB 
encumbers X with a $50 liability and distributes the proceeds of 
the borrowing to C. A guarantees all the liabilities of AB, 
60See, e.g., WilliamS. McKee, William F. Nelson & Robert L. Whitmire, WARREN, GORHAM & LAMONT, at~ 
13.03[2][b] (4th ed 2007). 
61When the Temporary Code Sec. 707 Regulation was initially issued, the Code Sec. 752 Limitation was formulated 
differently, as follows," ... without including in such partner's share any amount of the liability for which another 
partner bears the economic risk ofloss for the partnership liability under Sec. 1.752-2." This formulation was 
criticized on the grounds that excluding liabilities that are recourse to another partner was inconsistent with the 
stated rationale of the rule that a partner's share of overall partnership profits is a better measure of who really bears 
the burden of repayment of the debt and also because it gave rise to problems if the contributor and another partner 
both guaranteed the relevant liability. See Amy S. Elliott, Treaswy to Clarify Tempormy Disguised Sale 
Regulations, 2016 TNT 208-1 (Oct. 27, 2016). A "technical correction" to the Code Sec. 752 Limitation was issued 
to address the latter concern, but not the former. 
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including this newly incurred liability. Assume C's share of 
partnership profits is 10%. C's share of the newly incurred liability 
under Code Sec. 752 and the regulations thereunder is $0. 
Therefore, C's share of the liability for disguised sale purposes is 
$0 as a result of the Code Sec. 752 Limitation. Accordingly, C 
receives the $50 of taxable consideration as part of a disguised sale 
ofXtoAB. 
b. Example 14. C transfers property X, with a fair market value of 
$100, to partnership AB. Immediately after the transfer, AB 
encumbers X with a $50 liability and distributes the proceeds of 
the borrowing to C. A guarantees all the liabilities of AB, 
including this newly incurred liability. C indemnifies A for the first 
$5 that A would have to pay under its guarantee of the newly 
incurred liability. Assume C's share ofpatinership profits is 10%. 
C' s share of the newly incurred liability under Code Sec. 7 52 and 
the regulations thereunder is $5. Therefore, C's share of the 
liability for disguised sale purposes is $5 because the Code Sec. 
752 Limitation does not result in a lower share than C's share of 
the liability based on C' s share of pminership profits. Accordingly, 
C receives the $45 of taxable consideration as part of a disguised 
sale of X to AB. 
1. The result in Example 5 would be the same even if C 
indemnified A for the entire $50 ofthe newly incurred 
liability. That is, the Code Sec. 752 Limitation does not 
lead to a larger share of a partnership liability than the 
amount based on a pa1iner's share of partnership profits. 
11. It is unclear whether the Code Sec. 752 Limitation takes 
into account the patiners' shares of a partnership 
nomecourse liability under tier one and tier two of the 
allocation rules for nomecourse liabilities. It is difficult to 
grasp a rationale for why tier one and tier two would be 
relevant to the Code Sec. 752 Limitation, although the 
Code Sec. 752 Limitation, read literally, does not exclude 
tier one and tier two. A Treasury official has indicated that 
tier one and tier two are not intended to be included in the 
Code Sec. 752 Limitation.62 
c. Example 15. A transfers property X, with a fair market value of 
$100 and basis of $0, to patinership AB. B transfers $5 of cash to 
AB. Immediately after the transfers, AB encumbers X with a 
liability of $90 and distributes the proceeds of the borrowing to A. 
62Amy S. Elliot, Clarification to Disguised Sale Rules Causing Confusion, 2016 TNT 228-2 (Nov. 28, 2016). 
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B guarantees the top $45 of the liability so that only B bears the 
economic risk ofloss for that portion of the liability. Assume A's 
share of AB's profits is 66.66%, which would result in a $60 share 
ofthe liability but for the Code Sec. 752 Limitation. A's share of 
the liability under Code Sec. 7 52, taking into account only the 
General Rule for excess nonrecourse liabilities, is $30 (i.e., 2/3 x 
$45 nonguaranteed portion of the debt). A's share of the liability 
under Code Sec. 752, taking into account tier two, is $45. 
1. It is unclear under the Code Sec. 752 Limitation whether 
A's share of the liability for disguised sale purposes is 
limited to $30 or $45. 
E. CONCLUSION 
1. We agree that the prior disguised sale rules were overly generous in 
allowing taxpayers to use leverage to extract equity from property 
transferred to a partnership while shifting the burden of repaying the debt 
to other partners. 
a. Nevertheless, the Conference Report described a "borrowing 
through the partnership" exception, and the Temporary Code Sec. 
707 Regulation does not attempt to preserve that exception at all. 
The "borrowing through the partnership" exception described in 
the Conference Report involved a situation in which only 
contributed property is encumbered by a liability (and, presumably, 
other partnership property does not secure the liability) and the 
contributing partner bears the risk of loss with respect to the 
liability. 
b. In that situation, it appears that the contributing partner is 
effectively extracting equity from its contributed property that it 
could have extracted from the property by borrowing outside the 
partnership. 
c. While the prior disguised sale rules on this point were overly 
generous, arguably a "borrowing through the partnership" 
exception should have been preserved where the liability was 
secured only by the contributed property, consistent with the 
direction of the Conference Report. 
2. The new rule was a significant departure from the approach of the 2014 
Proposed Regulations. Because the rule was issued as a temporary and not 
a proposed regulation, taxpayers were denied the opportunity to provide 
comments on the rule before it became effective. 
a. In light of the fact that leveraged partnerships had been a feature of 
the tax law known to the government for many years, the issuance 
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of the regulation in temporary form cannot be justified on grounds 
of eliminating some new abuse. 
b. Moreover, the temporary regulation as originally promulgated was 
the subject of a prompt "technical conection" relating to the Code. 
Sec. 752 Limitation. 
c. Further, as discussed above, the language of the conected Code 
Sec. 752 Limitation is still arguably defective, which reinforces the 
conclusion that the regulation should have been issued in proposed 
rather than temporary fmm. 
3. Executive Order 13789 and Subsequent Developments: 
a. As noted above, in Executive Order 13789, the Secretary of the 
Treasury was directed to immediately review all significant tax 
regulations issued on or after January 1, 2016, and submit a report 
identifying regulations that (i) impose an undue fmancial burden 
on U.S. taxpayers; (ii) add undue complexity to the Federal tax 
laws; or (iii) exceed the statutory authority ofthe IRS. 
b. The IRS and Treasury issued Notice 2017-3 8, identifying 
regulations as either imposing an undue fmancial burden on 
taxpayers or adding undue complexity to the Code, and the Notice 
included the temporary Section 707 regulations, regarding the 
allocation of liabilities for purposes of the disguised sale mles. 
c. In its "Second Report to the President on Identifying and Reducing 
Tax Regulatory Burdens," the Treasury indicated it is considering 
whether the temporary Section 707 regulations should be revoked, 
with the prior regulations reinstated .. 
46 
